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Abstract
This paper considers the analysis and design of resilient/robust decentralized control systems. Specifically, we
aim to assess how the pairing of sensors and actuators lead to architectures that are resilient to attacks/hacks for
industrial control systems and other complex cyber-physical systems. We consider inherent structural properties such
as internal fixed modes of a dynamical system depending on actuation, sensing, and interconnection/communication
structure for linear discrete time-invariant dynamical systems. We introduce the notion of resilient fixed-modes
free system that ensures the non-existence of fixed modes when the actuation-sensing-communication structure
is compromised due to attacks by a malicious agent on actuators, sensors, or communication components and
natural failures. Also, we provide a graph-theoretical characterization for the resilient structurally fixed modes
that enables to capture the non-existence of resilient fixed modes for almost all possible systems’ realizations.
Additionally, we address the minimum actuation-sensing-communication co-design ensuring the non-existence of
resiliently structurally fixed modes, which we show to be NP-hard. Notwithstanding, we identify conditions that
are often satisfied in engineering settings and under which the co-design problem is solvable in polynomial-
time complexity. Furthermore, we leverage the structural insights and properties to provide a convex optimization
method to design the gain for a parametrized system and satisfying the sparsity of a given information pattern.
Thus, exploring the interplay between structural and non-structural systems to ensure their resilience. Finally, the
efficacy of the proposed approach is demonstrated on a power grid example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex cyber-physical and industrial control systems (ICS) are prevalent in a wide range of application
domains such as multi-agent networks, infrastructure systems such as the electric power grid, autonomous
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2vehicles, industrial machinery, process control, and manufacturing systems [1]–[4]. Modern ICS are
complex interconnected combinations of hardware and software components including sensors, actuators,
physical dynamical systems/processes, computational systems (e.g., microprocessors, programmable logic
controllers – PLCs), and communication mechanisms. With the increasing complexity and connectivity
of cyber-physical systems, the potential attack surface for cyber-attacks is also increasing [5]–[12].
There are, in general, various types of attacks (Figure 1) relevant in a cyber-physical control system
application including:
• modification of the behavior (control parameters, logic, timing, or run-time process variables) of a
computational node (e.g., a computer implementing a controller);
• modification of messages between computational nodes; and
• modification of sensor or actuator messages/signals.
To develop a truly cyber-resilient system, each computational node, sensor input, actuator output, and
communication link must be considered as potentially vulnerable, and a resilient control methodology
must be developed to accommodate malicious modifications, failures, and malfunctions of any subsets of
the overall set of these components.
Current-day real-world systems often inherently are of a decentralized control structure due to con-
straints/requirements such as communication-related restrictions, requirements for fault tolerance and
resiliency, security-related considerations, etc. Due to the decentralized nature of the sensing-actuation
capabilities of ICS, there typically exist a multitude of decision-makers, each of which only has access
to partial data. Some groundbreaking work in the understanding of necessary and sufficient conditions to
ensure arbitrary spectrum placement of closed-loop systems constrained to specified information patterns
can be found in [1], [13]–[15]. In recent years, research in decentralized control has seen several advances
that contributed to a renewed interest in the field [16]–[22]. To address the cyber-resiliency needs,
sensor-actuator-communication structural interconnection and decentralized control system design and
implementation techniques are developed in this paper.
In this paper, our aim is to develop a methodology to co-design actuation-sensing-communication
topologies to attain a given performance under disruptive scenarios such as natural failures or attacks
by a malicious agent on actuators, sensors, or communication components of the system. The threat
model considered here is the disabling of a subset of actuators, sensors, and sensor-actuator feedback
links in a decentralized control system. This class of attacks can be modeled as zeroing out specific
“attacked” elements of the closed-loop feedback gain matrix. Such an attack on a sensor-actuator feedback
interconnection could, as illustrated in Figure 1, result from an attack on a sensor, a computational node,
or an actuator.
3To achieve resiliency against such attacks, the proposed design methodology seeks to guarantee certain
closed-loop system properties regardless of attack/non-attack conditions. Specifically, we aim to determine
the minimum sensor-actuator pairing structure and a corresponding control algorithm that together guaran-
tee that the closed-loop system attains a given performance under disruptive scenarios. In particular, given
a system, one aspect of the problem considered here is to determine the structure of sensor locations (i.e.,
state dependencies of sensor measurements), actuator locations (i.e., state variables directly controlled),
and communication between sensors and actuators so as to provide certain resiliency properties of the
resulting closed-loop system.
Fig. 1: Closed-loop feedback structure in an ICS and illustration of the various possible attack locations. The proposed
methodology addresses a general multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) system with multiple decentralized feedback controllers;
the figure shows one feedback link for simplicity.
Several necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize the structural controllability, as well as
their verification, are known for linear time-invariant [23], and switching systems [24]. However, the
design of actuation capabilities to ensure that these conditions hold has only been addressed in the
last few years [25]–[31]. In particular, the problem of determining the minimum number of actuated
variables ensuring structural controllability in LTI systems was addressed in [27], [29], and later extended
to the case when cost constraints on the actuated state variables are imposed [28]. Further, when the
actuation capabilities are known a priori, the problem of choosing the minimum subset of these to ensure
structural controllability was shown to be NP-hard in [31]. The problem of determining the minimum
number of actuated variables to ensure structural controllability was extended for discrete-time fractional
dynamics [32] and linear time-invariant switching systems [33]. It was shown in [30] that determining
the minimum actuation-sensing-communication required to ensure the existence of decentralized control
laws in a generic structural system is NP-hard. However, none of these results address the design of
secured/resilient decentralized closed-loop systems as we propose in the current paper. Yet, it is to be
noted that the design of robust actuation/sensing configurations has been previously addressed and shown
to be NP-hard [34]; more specifically, when the goal is to determine the minimum number of actuated
4state variables such that the system is structurally controllable under an actuator failure. The feasible
minimal communication-pairings between sensors and actuators allowing decentralized control laws, i.e.,
essential information patterns, were studied in [35], and shown to be an NP-hard problem. In [36], the
p-robustness of the power grid was analyzed with respect to transmission line failures, i.e., the number
of failures that can occur while guaranteeing generic controllability of the associated dynamical system
was determined. Hereafter, we leverage the insights gained in previous works and extend the previous
literature to enable the actuation-sensing-communication co-design to cope with disruptive scenarios. To
the best of authors’ knowledge this is the first approach of this kind to the proposed co-design problem,
which require the introduction of new concepts and methodologies, as we propose to in this paper.
The main contributions of this paper are fivefold: (i) introduction of the notion of resilient fixed-modes
free system that ensures the non-existence of fixed modes when the actuation-sensing-communication
structure is compromised; (ii) a graph-theoretical representation that ensures almost always the non-
existence of resilient fixed modes; (iii) we show that the minimum actuation-sensing-communication co-
design problem under disruptive scenarios, i.e., the minimum actuation-sensing-communication structure
that ensures a system without resilient fixed modes almost always, is NP-hard; (iv) we propose an efficient
(i.e., polynomial-time) solution to the minimum actuation-sensing-communication co-design problem
under disruptive scenarios for subclasses of dynamical systems that are often found in practical engineering
settings; and (v) determining, for a parametrized system, a stabilizing gain satisfying the sparsity of a
given information pattern using convex optimization tools.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The formal problem statement is provided in
Section II. Section III reviews some concepts and introduces results in structural systems theory and com-
putational complexity. The main technical results are presented in Section IV, followed by an illustrative
example in Section V. Concluding remarks are presented in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a (possibly) large-scale system modeled by
x[k + 1] = Ax[k] +Bu[k], y[k] = Cx[k], (1)
where x ∈ Rn is the state of the system, u ∈ Rp is the input vector collecting the control signals and
y ∈ Rm are the output vector collecting the measurements. To reduce the computational requirements to
determine the input signal at the controller, one may consider a static output feedback (SOF) strategy
provided as follows:
u[k] = Ky[k] = KCx[k], (2)
5hence, the closed-loop control system (1) using SOF (2) is described as follows:
x[k + 1] = (A+BKC)x[k]. (3)
For notational convenience, in the remainder of the paper, we refer to (3) by the tuple (A,B,C,K), and
we identify the system in (1) with the tuple (A,B,C). However, the data collected by the sensors is not
always available to all actuators, which implies that the matrix K may have some zeros, i.e., it is not a full
matrix. To formalize these notions, which are the core of decentralized control, we need to account for
the information patterns, i.e., the sparsity of the gain matrix K, given by a binary matrix K¯ ∈ {0, 1}p×m,
where K¯i,j = 1 if the measurements from sensor j are available by actuator i, and zero otherwise.
Remark 1: For simplicity in illustrating the primary concepts introduced in this paper, the closed-loop
system is formulated above as an LTI dynamic system and a static output feedback controller. Observe
that the basic proposed design concepts can be extended to account for dynamic controllers that keeps
track of the history or includes an observer to estimate unmeasured parts of the state, instead of simply
constructing a feedback as a static gain applied to measured outputs [1], [17], [18]. 
Now, suppose that a natural failure or an attack to the actuator-sensor-communication structure oc-
curs. Then, we need the notion of robust information patterns, i.e., the actuation-sensing-communication
topology, associated with the existence of decentralized control strategies under disruptive scenarios.
Subsequently, we introduce the notion of resilient fixed modes that are a natural extension of fixed
modes [13] (i.e., the eigenvalues of the closed-loop system that cannot be changed by considering
different gains satisfying a prescribed information pattern), when accounting for communication failures,
or, equivalently, actuators and sensor failures as explained before (see Figure 1).
Definition 1: Consider system (1)-(2) with p actuators and m sensors, K the set of possible commu-
nication links from the sensors to the actuators, and {Γi}i∈∆ the collection of possible communication
failures, with Γi ⊂ K for all i ∈ ∆. The set
Σ(A,B,C;K, {Γi}i∈∆) =
⋃
i∈∆
⋂
K∈[K¯(K)]Γip,m
σ(A+BKC)
is defined to be the set of resilient fixed modes under a collection of feedback failures {Γi}i∈∆ of the
closed-loop system (3) with respect to the information pattern K¯(K), where K¯i,j = 1 if (j, i) ∈ K and
zero otherwise, and [K¯(K)]Γip,m is the set of all possible p ×m constant output feedback matrices given
by [K¯(K)]Γip,m = {K ∈ Rp×m : Klk = 0 if (k, l) /∈ K or (k, l) ∈ Γi, 0 ≤ l ≤ p, 0 ≤ k ≤ m}. 
Notice that by ensuring that the system does not have any resilient fixed modes, it is guaranteed that
under any resulting information pattern, all the closed-loop system eigenvalues can be arbitrarily placed
by choosing the feedback gain appropriately.
6Additionally, in many practical scenarios, it is often the case that the exact values of the non-zero
parameters of the plant matrices are unknown. To address this problem, in this paper, we adopt the
framework of structural systems [23]. To this end, let A¯ ∈ {0, 1}n×n, B¯ ∈ {0, 1}n×p and C¯ ∈ {0, 1}n×m be
the binary matrices that represent the structural patterns (location of fixed zeros and unknown parameters)
of A,B, and C, respectively. We then focus on properties of systems, where the plant matrices have these
sparsity patterns (A¯, B¯, C¯) which we refer to as a structural system. In the context of structural systems,
controllability and observability are referred to as structural controllability and structural observability,
respectively. The structural systems counterpart of the fixed modes concept is referred to as structural
fixed modes, which, essentially, are the fixed modes attributed to the structural pattern of a system, as
opposed to those that originate from the canceling of numerical parameters [37], [38]. Therefore, almost
all systems in the sparsity class (A¯, B¯, K¯, C¯) have no fixed modes, and, hence, allow pole placement
arbitrarily close to any pre-specified (symmetrical about the real axis) set of eigenvalues by a static output
feedback with the sparsity of K¯ [37]. Subsequently, the resilient fixed-modes can also be understood from
a structural systems perspective, and formally defined as follows.
Definition 2: Consider system (1)-(2) with p actuators and m sensors, and denote its structural pattern
by (A¯, B¯, C¯;K, {Γi}i∈∆), where K is the set of possible communication links from the sensors to the
actuators, and {Γi}i∈∆ the collection of possible communication failures, with Γi ⊂ K for all i ∈ ∆. Then,
(A¯, B¯, C¯;K, {Γi}i∈∆) is said to have structurally resilient fixed modes w.r.t. an information pattern K¯(K),
where K¯i,j = 1 if (j, i) ∈ K and zero otherwise, if for almost all A ∈ [A¯]n×n, B ∈ [B¯]n×p, C ∈ [C¯]m×n,
we have Σ(A,B,C;K, {Γi}i∈∆) 6= ∅. 
Hereafter, we focus on the analysis and design of secured/resilient closed-loop control systems. There-
fore, the first problem addresses the analysis, and can be formulated as follows:
P1 : Provide necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that a system has no structurally resilient fixed
modes w.r.t. an information pattern and a collection of possible communication failures. ◦
Then, with these conditions, we aim to design secured/resilient large-scale closed-loop control systems.
More precisely, suppose that only the structure of the autonomous system is known, i.e., A¯. Then, the
goal is to determine the location of dedicated actuators and sensors (i.e., that only actuate and measure a
single state variable, respectively). This scenario is commonly found in practice since state variables
have specific physical properties associated with them [2], [3]. For instance, in power systems one
often controls/measure the frequency of different generators and aggregate loads [39]. In addition, the
communication between sensors and actuators, such that the system has no structurally resilient fixed
modes w.r.t. the information pattern induced by the chosen communication links and any set of possible
actuator-sensor-communication failures containing at most k elements. In other words, given A¯, we want
7to determine (B¯(IB), C¯(IC), K¯(K)), where B¯ (respectively, C¯) contain columns (respectively, rows) with
at most one nonzero entry in each column (respectively, row) indexed by the elements in the collection
IB ≡ {ιi}i∈I with ιi ∈ {1, · · · , n} (respectively, IC ≡ {ιj}j∈J ), and Ki,j = 1 if (j, i) ∈ K, and
zero otherwise. Notice that, in particular, IB and IC may contain several times the same index, which
corresponds to the case where the same state variable is actuated and measured by different actuators
and sensors, respectively. On the contrary, K does not contain twice the same pair of indices since these
correspond uniquely to a sensor-actuator pair, and multiple simultaneous communications between the
sensor and actuator in the pair are not allowed. Therefore, we have the following reslient actuation-
sensing-communication co-design problem:
P2 : Given A¯, and a maximum of k actuator-sensor-communication failures, we want to determine
(B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K∗)), where (I∗B, I∗C ,K∗) is a solution to the following optimization problem:
min
IB ,IC ,K
|IB|+ |IC |+ |K| (4)
s. t. (A¯, B¯(IB \ JB), C¯(IC \ JC);K,J ) has no struct.
resilient fixed modes, for all J ⊂ K,JB ⊂ IB,
JC ⊂ IC , and |J |+ |JB|+ |JC | ≤ k,
where |IB| and |IC | are the number of dedicated actuators and sensors, respectively, i.e., the number of
elements in the collections IB and IC , and |K| are the number of communication links from the sensors
to the actuators to obtain the decentralized closed-loop control system. ◦
Unfortunately, the co-design problem P2 is NP-hard, as we show in the Theorem 2. Therefore, in this
paper we identify a set of conditions that are commonly found in engineering applications (see Remark 3),
and under which we provide a computationally tractable procedure.
Lastly, in many ICS applications, one is only required to ensure stabilizability of the closed-loop system,
which implies that only the open-loop unstable eigenvalues need to be changed. In other words, it is not
required to ensure placing of all the eigenvalues, which is known to be NP-hard [40]. Therefore, the last
problem addressed in this paper can be stated as follows:
P3 : Given a realization (A,B,C) of (A¯, B¯, C¯) and K¯ from the design in P2, determine a gain K ∈ [K¯]
such that (A,B,C,K) is asymptotically stable. ◦
Subsequently, we formulate an optimization problem whose feasibility allows to determine if the generic
design obtained in P2 holds for a specific parameterization. Furthermore, we propose a convex optimization
formulation whose feasibility enables us to retrieve a solution to P3.
8III. PRELIMINARIES AND TERMINOLOGY
In order to perform structural analysis efficiently, it is customary to associate to (1) a directed graph
(digraph) D = (V , E), in which V denotes the set of vertices and E ⊆ V×V the set of edges, where (vj, vi)
represents an edge from the vertex vj to vertex vi. Consider the structural systems (A¯, B¯, C¯), then we can
denote by X = {x1, . . . , xn}, U = {u1, . . . , up} and Y = {y1, . . . , ym} the sets of state, input and output
vertices respectively, and EX ,X = {(xi, xj) : A¯ji 6= 0}, EU ,X = {(uj, xi) : B¯ij 6= 0}, and EX ,Y = {(xi, yj) :
C¯ji 6= 0} the edges between the sets in subscript. In addition, given an information pattern K¯ ∈ {0, 1}p×m,
describing output feedback in the inputs, we also have EY,U = {(yj, ui) : K¯ij 6= 0}. In particular, we have
the state digraph D(A¯) = (X , EX ,X ), the system digraph D(A¯, B¯, C¯) = (X ∪U ∪Y , EX ,X ∪ EU ,X ∪ EX ,Y),
and the closed-loop system digraph D(A¯, B¯, C¯, K¯) = (X ∪ U ∪ Y , EX ,X ∪ EU ,X ∪ EX ,Y ∪ EY,U).
In what follows, we consider the well known concepts of directed path, elementary path, cycle, strongly
connected component (SCC) and directed acyclic graph (DAG) [27], [41]. In addition, we can classify the
SCCs in a DAG with respect to the existence of incoming and/or outgoing edges as follows: an SCC is
non-top linked if it has no incoming edges from another SCC, and non-bottom linked if it has no outgoing
edges to another SCC.
For any digraph D = (V , E) and any two vertex sets S1,S2 ⊂ V , we define the bipartite graph
B(S1,S2, ES1,S2) whose vertex set is given by S1 ∪ S2 (where S1 and S2 are assumed to be disjoint) and
the edge set ES1,S2 = E ∩ (S1 × S2). In addition, we will make heavy use of the state bipartite graph
B(A¯) ≡ B(X ,X , EX ,X ), which is the bipartite graph associated with the state digraph D(A¯) = (X , EX ,X ).
Given B(S1,S2, ES1,S2), a matching M corresponds to a subset of edges in ES1,S2 so that no two edges
have a vertex in common. A maximum matching M∗ is a matching M that has the largest number of
edges among all possible matchings. We call the vertices in S1 and S2 belonging to an edge in M∗, the
matched vertices with respect to (w.r.t.) M∗, and unmatched vertices otherwise. If the set of unmatched
vertices associated with a maximum matching are empty, then we have a perfect matching. For ease of
referencing, in the remaining of the paper, the term right-unmatched vertices associated with the matching
M of B(S1,S2, ES1,S2) (not necessarily maximum), will refer to those vertices in S2 that do not belong
to a matching edge in M∗, dually a vertex from S1 that does not belong to an edge in M∗ is called a
left-unmatched vertex, see, for instance, [27] for an illustrative example of the concepts.
Finally, we need to introduce the following definition to create the pairing between outputs and inputs.
Definition 3 (Sequential-pairing): Consider two sets of indices I = {i1, . . . , in} and J = {j1, . . . , jm},
and a maximum matching M of the bipartite graph B(J , I, EJ ,I), where EJ ,I ⊆ J × I. We denote by
9|I,J 〉M a sequential-pairing induced by M , defined as follows:
|I,J 〉M =
( ⋃
l=2,...,k
{(il, jl−1)}
)
∪ {(i1, jk)},
where (il, jl) ∈M , for l = 1, . . . , k. 
Remark 2: The sequential-pairing consists in the collection of edges such that M ∪ |I,J 〉M forms a
cycle. 
IV. RESILIENT ACTUATION-SENSING-COMMUNICATION CO-DESIGN
In this section, we present the main results of this paper. First, in Theorem 1, we introduce the graph-
theoretical characterization of resilient structurally fixed modes, which provide us with a characterization
for analysis of resilient systems as solicited in P1. Then, in Theorem 2, we show that the resilient
co-design problem presented in P2 is NP-hard. Notwithstanding, we characterize the solutions to P2,
under assumptions that are often found in engineering settings, and that can be efficiently obtained
(Theorem 4). Towards this goal, we explore different scenarios that enable us to gain some insights
on how the structure constraints the existence of resilient structurally fixed modes. In particular, we show
how that communication infrastructure can be established to ensure the resilience of the system when only
communication failures/attacks are performed (see Theorem 3). Furthermore, in Section IV-A, we discuss
how these assumptions can be waived in the case where we seek system’s stabilization. Subsequently, in
Section IV-B, we provide a feasibility criteria for the stabilization of a particular plant without unstable
resilient fixed modes (Theorem 5), and an iterative optimization scheme is provided in Algorithm 1 to
obtain a specific gain, which feasibility is detailed in Theorem 6; thus, providing a bridge between the
structural design the existence of a specific gain when a specific parameterization of the system plant is
considered.
We start by addressing P1, i.e., we provide necessary and sufficient conditions required to attain a
closed-loop system that is free of resilient structurally fixed modes.
Theorem 1: The structural system (A¯, B¯, C¯;K, {Γi}i∈∆) associated with (3) has no resilient structurally
fixed modes if and only if both of the following conditions hold for all i ∈ ∆:
(a) in D(A¯, B¯, C¯;K,Γi) = (X ∪U ∪Y , EX ,X ∪EX ,Y ∪EU ,X ∪ (EY,U \EΓi)), with EΓi = {(yi, uj) : (j, i) ∈
Γi}, each state vertex x ∈ X is contained in an SCC which includes an edge of EY,U \ EΓi;
(b) there exists a disjoint union of cycles Ck = (Vk, Ek) (subgraph of D(A¯, B¯, C¯; K,Γi)) with k ∈ N
such that X ⊂ ⋃kj=1 Vj . 
These conditions are key in ensuring feasibility of the solutions attained in the resilient actuation-
sensing-communication co-design problem. Nonetheless, these are also intrinsic to the computational
complexity associated with determining a solution to P2, as we formally state in the next result.
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Theorem 2: The resilient co-design problem P2 is NP-hard. 
Although P2 is NP-hard, it does not mean that all instances of the problem are equally computationally
challenging. Therefore, in what follows we seek to determine conditions under which the problem is
computationally tractable. Specifically, we propose to address P2 under the following assumption:
A1 The structural dynamic matrix A¯ is such that the state bipartite graph B(A¯) = B(X ,X , EX ,X ),
associated with A¯, has a perfect matching. 
In other words, assumption A1 can be interpreted as D(A¯) being spanned by a disjoint union of cycles
(see [27] for details). In particular, this assumption is of practical interest in engineering applications as
emphasized in the next remark.
Remark 3: We notice that this assumption covers a practically relevant class of systems since it subsumes
the following scenarios: (i) almost all dynamical systems modeled as random networks of the Erdo˝s-Rényi
type [42]; (ii) discretized dynamical systems using Euler discretization for almost all discretization steps;
(iii) several dynamical systems as presented in [2], [3]. 
Now, we consider the minimum actuation-sensing capabilities, and describe how to determine the
sparsest information pattern that ensures the closed-loop system has no structurally resilient fixed modes.
Towards this goal, we first consider the following procedure.
Procedure 1: Consider I∗B and I∗C to be the minimum collections of state variables’ indices associated with
dedicated actuators and sensors, respectively, such that the pair (A¯, B¯(I∗B)) and (A¯, C¯(I∗C)) is structurally
controllable and observable, respectively. Further, without loss of generality, assume that |I∗B| ≤ |I∗C |, with
IB = {1, . . . , |I∗B|} and IC = {1, . . . , |I∗C |} the sets of indices numbering the dedicated inputs and outputs,
respectively. Further, define the bipartite graph B = B(IB, IC , EIB ,IC ) having an edge (i, j) ∈ EIB ,IC if
there is a path from dedicated actuator i ∈ IB to dedicated sensor j ∈ IC (in which case we say that an
actuator reaches a sensor, or a sensor is reached by an actuator). Therefore, a maximum matching M∗
of B describes the maximum number of actuators that reach an equal number of sensors. Subsequently,
by considering an information pattern K¯(K), where K is given by the sequential-pairing |IB, IC〉M∗ ,
it follows that D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K)) has a single non-top linked SCC that contains all non-top
and non-bottom SCCs of D(A¯), with variables controlled and measured by the actuators and sensors,
respectively, labelled by the indexes that belong to edges in M∗. Furthermore, it also contains all SCCs
that are simultaneously reachable and reach these non-top and non-bottom SCCs. Intuitively, several SCCs
are contracted into a single one with the auxiliary of feedback links, which ensure that the newly created
non-top linked SCC satisfies Theorem 1-(a).
Nonetheless, D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K)) still has |I∗C | − |I∗B| non-bottom linked SCCs, as well as
(possibly) additional SCCs that reach these. Therefore, a total of |I∗C | − |I∗B| additional feedback links,
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corresponding to the indices of IC not present in the edges of M∗, need to be considered. Let K′ correspond
to feedback links starting in the dedicated sensors labelled by the former indices, and ending in only one
of the dedicated actuators indexed by IB. Then, D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K ∪ K′)), consists in a single
SCC with feedback links on it, which implies that the closed-loop digraph readily satisfies Theorem 1-(a).
Thus, under the assumption A1, K¯(K∗) with K∗ = K ∪ K′ is a sparsest information pattern ensuring a
closed-loop system without structurally fixed modes. ◦
Subsequently, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1: Given (A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C)), where I∗B and I∗C are the minimum collections of state variables
ensuring structural controllability and observability, then Procedure 1 originates a sparsest information
pattern K¯(K∗) such that (A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K∗)) has no structurally fixed modes, under assumption A1.
In addition, Procedure 1 can be implemented in polynomial time, more precisely, O(max{|V|+|E|, (|I∗B|+
|I∗C |)
5
2}), where V and E are the number of vertices and edges of D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C)), respectively. 
In fact, we can consider the scenario where only failures/attacks at the communication infrastructure
level occur. In such scenario, we need to provide robust information patterns, i.e., that can account for
an arbitrary number k of communication failure while ensuring a resilient structurally fixed modes free
system, which can be obtained by extending Lemma 1 as described in the next result.
Theorem 3: Given (A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C)), where I∗B and I∗C are the minimum collections of state vari-
ables’ indices ensuring structural controllability and observability respectively, and k the maximum num-
ber of communication failures, then K¯(K∗) such that K∗ = K(1) ∪ . . . ∪ K(k+1), where K(i) is deter-
mined using Procedure 1 and K(i) ∩ K(j) = ∅ for i 6= j, is a sparsest information pattern that ensures
(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K∗)) to have no structurally fixed modes w.r.t. K¯(K∗) under assumption A1, and
any set of failures indexed by J ⊂ K∗, with |J | ≤ k. In addition, these can be determined in polynomial
time, more precisely, O(kmax{|V|+ |E|, (|I∗B|+ |I∗C |)
5
2}), where |V| and |E| are the number of vertices
and edges of D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C)), respectively. 
Remark 4: To ensure that two sparsest information patterns using Procedure 1 are such that K(i)∩K(j) =
∅ for i 6= j, one just needs to ensure that the edges in the maximum matching M (i) found to determine
K(i) are not considered when computing K(j). Therefore, when computing K(j), instead of the set EIB ,IC
of the bipartite graph we just need to consider EIB ,IC \
(⋃j−1
l=1 M
(l)
)
. Hence, the procedure does not
increase the computational complexity. 
Therefore, it is worth to notice that the sparsest communication required under k possible communication
failures does not consist in the direct union of k+ 1 (arbitrary) sparsest information patterns. Besides, the
procedure to determine disjoint sparsest information patterns establishes an upper bound on the possible
number of failures/attacks on the communication, since it might not be possible to determine additional
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sparsest information patterns that are disjoint.
Next, to characterize the solutions to P2, we need the following lemma, which accounts for the minimum
collections of dedicated actuators that ensure structural controllability when k failures might occur.
Lemma 2: Under assumption A1, the pair (A¯, B¯(IB \ JB)) is structurally controllable, with JB ⊂ IB
and |JB| ≤ k if and only if for each non-top linked SCC of D(A¯) there exists at least k+ 1 indices in IB
corresponding to its state variables. In particular, the minimum number of dedicated actuators required
equals (k + 1)t, where t is the number of non-top linked SCCs, i.e., exactly k + 1 actuators controlling
state variables in each non-top linked SCC. 
Similarly, by duality between controllability and observability in LTI systems [43], we obtain a similar
result regarding the minimum number of sensors required to attain observability under at most k failures,
which we refer to the dual of Lemma 2.
Therefore, a solution to P2 can be characterized as follows.
Theorem 4: Let IB and IC be the indices associated minimum collection of dedicated actuators and
sensors B¯(I∗B) and C¯(I∗C), with I∗B = {ι1, . . . , ι(k+1)p} and I∗C = {γ1, . . . , γ(k+1)m}, where k denotes
the maximum number of actuator-sensor-communication failures. In addition, let I(i)B and I(i)C , with
i = 1, . . . , k + 1, be the indices associated minimum collection of dedicated actuators and sensors
B¯({ιi, . . . , ιip}) and C¯({γi, . . . , γim}) respectively, where (A¯, B¯({ιi, . . . , ιip})) and (A¯, C¯({γi, . . . , γim}))
are structurally controllable and observable, respectively. Further, let K(i) be the sparsest information
pattern determined with Procedure 1 when the two collections (I(i)B , I(i)C ) are considered. Then, under
assumption A1, (I∗B, I∗C ,K∗), where K∗ =
⋃k+1
j=1 K(j) is a solution to P2.
Furthermore, a solution to P2 can be determined in polynomial time, more precisely, O(kmax{|V| +
|E|, (|I∗B| + |I∗C |)
5
2}), where |V| and |E| are the number of vertices and edges of D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C)),
respectively. 
A. Resilient actuation-sensing-communication co-design for stabilization
In practice, it is often desirable to ensure only stabilizability of the closed-loop system, i.e., fixed modes
can exist as long as they are stable. The same readily applies for the structurally (resilient) fixed modes.
Specifically, we allow structurally fixed modes that are at the origin, and consequently we seek to placing
the remaining ones, which we refer to as (possibly) structurally unstable resilient fixed modes. Specifically,
consider the following variation of P2 which constraint is that of not having unstable structurally resilient
fixed modes.
Ps2 Given A¯, and a maximum of k actuator-sensor-communication failures, we want to determine (B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K∗)),
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where (I∗B, I∗C ,K∗) is a solution to the following optimization problem:
min
IB ,IC ,K
|IB|+ |IC |+ |K| (5)
s. t. (A¯, B¯(IB \ JB), C¯(IC \ JC); K¯,J ) has no
struct. unstable resilient fixed modes, for all
J ⊂ K¯,JB ⊂ IB,JC ⊂ IC , and
|J |+ |JB|+ |JC | ≤ k,
where |IB| and |IC | are the number of state variables actuated and measured, and |K| is the number of
communication links established from the sensors to the actuators to obtain the decentralized closed-loop
control system. ◦
In particular, it follows the feasibility conditions to Ps2 are attained if the following result holds.
Corollary 1: The structural system (A¯, B¯, C¯;K, {Γi}i∈∆) has no structurally fixed modes (other than
at the origin) if and only if in D(A¯, B¯, C¯;K,Γi) = (X ∪U ∪Y , EX ,X ∪EX ,Y ∪EU ,X ∪ (EY,U \ EΓi)) for all
i ∈ ∆, with EΓi = {(yi, uj) : (j, i) ∈ Γi}, each state vertex x ∈ X is contained in an SCC which includes
an edge of EY,U \ EΓi . 
Thus, it is possible to waive the assumption stated in A1, while obtaining similar results to those in
Theorem 4 that hold generally. Specifically, following the reasoning performed in the proof of Theorem 4,
we obtain the following result.
Corollary 2: Let IB and IC , be the indices associated minimum collection of dedicated actuators and
sensors B¯(I∗B) and C¯(I∗C), with I∗B = {ι1, . . . , ι(k+1)p} and I∗C = {γ1, . . . , γ(k+1)m}, and k the maximum
number of actuator-sensor-communication failures. In addition, let I(i)B and I(i)C , with i = 1, . . . , k + 1,
be the indices associated minimum collection of dedicated actuators and sensors B¯({ιi, . . . , ιip}) and
C¯({γi, . . . , γim}) respectively, where (A¯, B¯({ιi, . . . , ιip})) and (A¯, C¯({γi, . . . , γim})) are structurally con-
trollable and observable, respectively. Further, let K(i) be the sparsest information pattern determined with
Procedure 1 when the two collections (I(i)B , I(i)C ) are considered. Then, under assumption A1, (I∗B, I∗C ,K∗),
where K∗ = ⋃k+1j=1 K(j) is a solution to Ps2 .
Furthermore, a solution to Ps2 can be determined in polynomial time, more precisely, O(kmax{|V|+
|E|, (|I∗B| + |I∗C |)
5
2}), where V and E are the number of vertices and edges of D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C)),
respectively. 
B. Stabilizing the closed-loop parameterized system
Now, we discuss how the previous structural results can be leveraged to attain a specific gain matrix K
satisfying a specific information pattern, when the parameters of (A,B,C) are considered, and such that
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ALGORITHM 1: Stabilizability of the closed-loop system with possible communications between sensors and
actuators given by K, and a collection of possible communication failures {Γi}i∈∆, with Γi ⊂ K
Input: The system (A,B,C), a set of possible communications between sensors and actuators K and a collection of
possible communication failures {Γi}i∈∆, with Γi ⊂ K.
Output: a matrix K such that A˜(K) is Schur for {K ∈ [K¯(K)]Γi}i∈∆.
1: Find feasible points X0, Y0 and K0 that satisfy the constraints in (6). If a feasible point does not exist, then it is not
possible to stabilize the system with such information pattern constraints;
2: At iteration k > 0, from Xk, Yk obtain the matrices Xk+1, Yk+1 and Kk+1 solving
min
{K∈[K¯(K)]Γi}i∈∆, X,Y ∈SN+
trace(YkXk+1 +XkYk+1)
s.t.
 X A˜ᵀ(K)
A˜(K) Y
  0 X I
I Y
  0,
where A˜(K) =
 A B
C K
.
3: If the matrix
A˜k+1 =
 A B
C Kk+1

is Schur for Kk+1 ∈ [K¯]Γi , i ∈ ∆, stop the algorithm. Otherwise, set k = k + 1 and go to Step 2.
the closed-loop system is always asymptotically stable even if some failure occurs. Consequently, we are
left to ensure that K is such that the eigenvalues of A+ BKC lie within the unit circle in the complex
plane for K ∈ [K¯]Γip,m for i ∈ ∆. This condition is equivalent to say that A˜(K) =
 A B
C K
 is Schur.
Subsequently, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 5: Given (A,B,C), a set of possible communications between sensors and actuators K and
a collection of possible communication failures {Γi}i∈∆, with Γi ⊂ K, the N ×N matrix A˜(K) is Schur
for {K ∈ [K¯(K)]Γi}i∈∆, if and only if the following optimization problem
min
{K∈[K¯(K)]Γi}i∈∆, X,Y ∈SN+
trace(XY )
s.t.
 X A˜ᵀ(K)
A˜(K) Y
  0, X = Y −1 (6)
is feasible with optimal cost N .

Remark 5: Theorem 5 characterizes the existence of unstable resilient fixed modes versus the non-
existence of resilient structural fixed modes. More specifically, if there is a K satisfying (6) than it
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follows that the system has no unstable resilient fixed modes. Conversely, if the system has unstable
resilient fixed modes, then there is no feasible solution to (6). 
Theorem 5 provides a characterization of the solutions, but it is non convex. Hence, we propose to
approximate it by a recursive scheme as described in Algorithm 1, where each iteration can be efficiently
solved using standard LMI toolboxes, and whose feasibility properties are described in the following
result.
Theorem 6: Algorithm 1 determines a Schur matrix A˜(K) for {K ∈ [K¯(K)]Γi}i∈∆, if the sequence
trace(YkXk+1 +XkYk+1) converges to 2N . 
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we illustrate the main results obtained in the context of the power electric grid. More
specifically, we consider the IEEE 5-bus system as modeled in [39] that consists in a linearized model
under normal operating conditions, and provide the solution to problem P2 when k = 1 actuator-sensor-
communication failure can occur. In addition, we determine the gain (for a specific realization of the
system) subject to information pattern constraints as proposed in Algorithm 1.
The IEEE 5-bus power system consists of 3 synchronous generators connected to 2 aggregate loads
coupled through the network topology. The state digraph D(A¯) associated with its linearized dynamics A¯
is depicted in Figure 2, and it consists of 18 state variables, which physical interpretation is as follows:
x2, x5 and x8 represents the mechanical power of the turbine of the generator 1-3, respectively. The
generators’ frequency is captured by x1, x4 and x7 for generator 1-3 respectively, and x3, x6 and x9 their
valve opening. In addition, x11 and x13 is the real energy consumed by the aggregate load 1 and 2
respectively, and x10 and x12 their frequency measured locally. The different components are connected
through the injected/received power to/from the network at the connection site, which dynamics depend
on the frequency of the components on the neighboring buses; the injected/received power variables for
generator 1-3 and load 1-2 are captured by x14, x15, x16, x17 and x18, respectively. Furthermore, notice that
in the present setup, the assumption of considering dedicated inputs/outputs is consistent with the nature
of the physical quantities the state variables aim to capture.
We start by noticing that the state digraph depicted in Figure 2 consists of three SCCs, where one is non-
bottom linked and the other two are non-top linked SCCs. Let us denote the not-top linked SCCs containing
the state variable x11 (belonging to load 1) and x13 (belonging to load 2) by N T1 and N T2 , respectively. In
addition, let us denote the non-bottom linked SCC by NB1 . Furthermore, notice that assumption A1 holds,
since each state variable (vertex) has a self-loop, hence, the collection of these edges correspond to a
perfect matching of the state bipartite graph. Therefore, from Lemma 2 and its dual, we have that (I(1)B ≡
{1, 2}, I(1)C ≡ {1}) and (I(2)B ≡ {3, 4}, I(2)C ≡ {2}) correspond to two possible minimum collections of
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dedicated inputs and outputs ensuring structural controllability and observability, respectively. In addition,
I∗B = {11, 13, 11, 13} and I∗C = {10, 12}, which implies that B¯(I∗B) = [e11 e13 e11 e13] and C¯(I∗C) =
[e10 e12]
ᵀ, where ei ∈ R18 denotes the ith canonical vector with 1 in entry i and zero elsewhere, ensure
structural controllability and observability when one dedicated actuator-sensor fails, recall Lemma 2 and
its dual. Notice that from a physical point of view the actuation of the variables x11 and x13 means that we
just need to be able to actuate the real power consumed by the aggregate load. In particular, the actuation
capabilities considered assume that the generators inject electric power at a constant rate, delegating the
responsibility of stabilizing the network to the loads; in other words, the loads can both receive and inject
electric power in the network, playing the role of prosumers. It is also worth noting that the state variables
considered to be measured were the frequency of the aggregate load since it is locally inferred by one of
the loads, hence, requiring effective communication over a network of one data package to the remaining
load. Nonetheless, any other state variable in the non-bottom linked SCC would be a viable option.
Now, consider Procedure 1 when (I(1)B , I(1)C ) is considered. Then, B ≡ B(I(1)B , I(1)C , EI(1)B ,I(1)C ) where
EI(1)B ,I(1)C = {(1, 1), (2, 1)}, i.e., the the dedicated actuators controlling the state variables in the non-
top linked SCC N T1 and N T2 reach the dedicated sensor measuring the state variable in the non-bottom
linked SCC NB1 . A possible maximum matching M∗ associated with B is M∗ = {(2, 1)}, which implies
that K = {(1, 2)} is a possible sequential-pairing. In particular, notice that M∗ ∪ K = {(1, 2), (2, 1)}
forms a cycle. Subsequently, D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K)) contains only one non-top and one non-bottom
linked SCC containing state variables. Therefore, we just need to consider K′ = {(1, 1)} as prescribed
in Procedure 1, and it follows that D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K(1) ≡ K∪K′)) has a single SCC containing
state variables with two feedback links on it.
Similarly, Procedure 1 can be used when the pair (I(2)B , I(2)C ) is considered, which leads to K(2) =
{(2, 3), (2, 4)}. The digraph D(A¯, B¯(I∗B), C¯(I∗C), K¯(K∗ ≡ K(1) ∪ K(2))) that accounts for the obtained
solution is depicted in Figure 2.
In addition, by noticing that all state variables in D(A¯) have self-loops, it follows that assumption A1
holds. Hence, invoking Theorem 4, we obtain that (I∗B, I∗C ,K∗) is a solution to P2 when k = 1.
In addition, we notice that by Corollary 2 the same procedure ensures the existence of no structurally
fixed mode other than those at the origin, even if assumption A1 does not hold.
Now, consider Algorithm 1 when all generators and loads have equal parameterization, perturbed by
zero mean Gaussian noise with standard deviation squared equal to 0.1. In particular, the nonzero entries
of A are as follows: A1,1 = 0.2309, A3,1 = 0.8005, A14,1 = 0.7662, A15,1 = 0.9755, A17,1 = 1.0123,
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Fig. 2: This figure presents the digraph D(A¯, B¯, C¯, K¯(K∗)), with four dedicated actuators depicted in blue, two dedicated
sensors depicted in dark green, and the feedback links depicted by gray arrows. The state digraph representation of the 5-bus
system is enclosed by the red round box, where the state vertices in gray and black belong to load 1 and 2, respectively.
The state vertices in red, orange and brown belong to generator 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The different SCCs are enclosed
the dashed boxes, where the squared dashed boxes represent the non-top linked SCCs and the remaining SCC is non-bottom
linked. Finally, notice that all state variables have self-loops depicted by green edges. The physical interpretation of the state
variables is provided in the main text.
A1,2 = 0.6275, A2,2 = 0.1166, A1,3 = 0.4365, A2,3 = −0.1303, A3,3 = −0.0100, A4,4 = 0.2154, A6,4 =
0.8283, A14,4 = 1.1273, A15,4 = 0.7095, A16,4 = 1.0272, A17,4 = 1.1220, A4,5 = 0.8733, A5,5 = 0.1938,
A4,6 = 0.3790, A5,6 = −0.0800, A6,6 = 0.2679, A7,7 = 0.1458, A9,7 = 1.1761, A15,7 = 0.7831, A16,7 =
0.6320, A18,7 = 0.9408, A7,8 = 0.6544, A8,8 = 0.1681, A7,9 = 0.3592, A8,9 = −0.2192, A9,9 = 0.0637,
A10,10 = 0.4795, A14,10 = 0.8029, A15,10 = 0.8851, A17,10 = 0.5781, A18,10 = 1.0721, A10,11 = −0.0275,
A11,11 = 0.7626, A12,12 = 0.2686, A16,12 = 0.7851, A17,12 = 1.0285, A18,12 = 0.4553, A12,13 = 0.1462,
A13,13 = 0.7775, A1,14 = 0.0491, A14,14 = 0.4760, A4,15 = 0.2080, A15,15 = 0.5730, A7,16 = −0.0535,
A16,16 = 0.5155, A10,17 = 0.0492, A17,17 = 0.0407, A12,18 = −0.0668, and A18,18 = 0.2072. The
eigenvalues of A have norms given as follows: 1.0072, 0.7775, 0.7626, 0.6652, 0.6636, 0.6636, 0.6017,
0.5674, 0.5674, 0.4802, 0.4802, 0.4678, 0.4081, 0.3596, 0.3001, 0.3001, 0.1359, and 0.1359. Hence, A is
not stable since one eigenvalue lie outside the unitary circle in the complex plane. In addition, consider
the set of communication links K = K(1) ∪ K(2), and assume that any communication link can fail
or be compromised by an attacker, more precisely, Γ1 = {(1, 1)}, Γ2 = {(1, 2)}, Γ3 = {(2, 3)} and
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Γ4 = {(2, 4)}. Consequently, by performing Algorithm 1, we obtain the following gain:
K =
[
0.6445 0−0.3043 0
0 −1.0079
0 −0.0000043329
]
,
where largest norm associated with the eigenvalue of the closed-loop system is 0.9918, which implies that
all eigenvalues lie within the unit circle in the complex plane; hence, the closed-loop system is stable. In
addition, if an actuator-sensor-communication failure encoded by Γi (i = 1, . . . , 4) occurs, then the gains
used by the closed-loop system are effectively modified due to loss of specific sensor-actuator feedback
links, i.e., due to the failure, the closed-loop system effectively uses the following gains:
KΓ1 =
[
0 0−0.3043 0
0 −1.0079
0 −0.0000043329
]
, KΓ2 =
[
0.6445 0
0 0
0 −1.0079
0 −0.0000043329
]
,
KΓ3 =
[
0.6445 0−0.3043 0
0 0
0 −0.0000043329
]
, KΓ4 =
[
0.6445 0−0.3043 0
0 −1.0079
0 0
]
,
where the norm of the largest eigenvalue of the closed-loop system are 0.9981, 0.9983, 0.9989, and 0.9918,
respectively. Thus, the closed-loop system remains stable under any of these effective gains, i.e., under
any of the considered set of attack conditions.
Computational Implementation Details: We notice that the gain matrices have to be square due to the
LMI constraint
 X I
I Y
  0, so we considered two additional sensors that do not measure any state
variable, i.e., they correspond to columns of C¯ with only zeros. For simulation purposes, we initialized
X0 and Y0 to be 22 × 22 identity matrices. Therefore, as prescribed in Theorem 6 the gains to stabilize
the closed-loop system exist if the cost function of the iterative algorithm (Algorithm 1) converges to
44. We resort to the CVX (as LMI solver) and Matlab to execute Algortihm 1, which terminated after
approximately 50 minutes in an Apple laptop with the following specifications: 2.6 GHz Intel Core i5
with 8 GB (1600 MHz DDR3) of memory, yet after approximately 25 min the objective of attaining a
Schur matrix was already attained. ◦
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this paper, we provided a solution to the problem of determining the minimum number of actuators,
sensors and communication between these, for linear discrete time-invariant plants, and such that desirable
control objectives of the closed-loop system are achieved. Namely, those achieving arbitrary performance
in terms of the system response and/or stabilizability with static output feedback, under possible disruptive
scenarios such as natural failures, or attacks by malicious agents, of actuators, sensors and communication
links.
More precisely, we introduced the notion of resilient fixed-modes free system that ensures the non-
existence of fixed modes when the actuation-sensing-communication structure is compromised; hence,
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crucial to ensure the proper functioning of the system under failures and/or attacks. In addition, we
provided a graph-theoretical representation that ensures almost always the non-existence of resilient fixed
modes, which we used to address the problem of designing the minimum actuation-sensing-communication
structure that ensures a system without resilient fixed modes almost always. Furthermore, we discussed
how the assumptions of the dynamical system structure can be waived in the context of stabilization,
while the methodology presented holds. Finally, we provided a convex optimization algorithm that ensures
stabilizability of the closed-loop system under possible actuator-sensor-communication failures, and we
illustrated the results in the context of smart grid, using the IEEE 5-bus system.
Future research will address how the proposed methodology can be extended to handle intermittent com-
munication schemes and delays of data, as well as considering potential actuation-sensing-communication
costs. In addition, we will focus on developing more efficient and general methods to find the gains
satisfying information patterns ensuring the closed-loop system have no resilient fixed modes.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof follows by comparison with the definition of structurally fixed modes and
its characterization provided in Theorem 4 in [44]. More precisely, from the definition of resilient fixed
modes (Definition 1) it follows that Σ(A,B,C;K, {Γi}i∈∆) = ∅ if and only if
⋂
K∈[K¯(K)]Γip,m σ(A+BKC) =
∅ for all i ∈ ∆. Subsequently, by definition of structurally fixed mode, it follows that a system has no
structurally resilient fixed modes with respect to an information pattern K¯(K) and a set of possible
failures {Γi}i∈∆ if and only if (A¯, B¯, C¯;K,Γi) has no structurally fixed modes for all i ∈ ∆. Thus,
invoking Theorem 4 in [44] the result follows. 
Proof of Theorem 2: The proof follows by reducing the minimum k robust structural controllability
problem, i.e., the problem of determining the minimum number of dedicated inputs required to ensure
structural controllabiliy under at most k > 1 input failures and given the structrural dynamical matrix A¯,
to the resilient co-design problem P2. Specifically, the same parameters A¯ and k > 1 can be adopted
for the problem P2, and a solution to P2 provides in particular, a solution to the minimum k > 1 robust
structural controllability problem can be retrieved from a solution to P2 since the system has no structurally
fixed modes only if it is structurally controllable and structurally observable [27]. Subsequently, if k
failures occur in the inputs, it follows that IB must contain a solution to the minimum k robust structural
controllability problem. In fact, we notice that IB consists into a solution to the latter problem, due to the
equivalence between actuation-sensing-communication failure in our modeling setup see Figure 1. Hence,
the result follows, i.e., P2 is at least as difficult as solving the minimum k robust structural controllability
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problem, which is known to be NP-hard [34]. 
Proof of Lemma 1: First, notice that by construction Procedure 1 provides a feasible solution. To show
optimality, we proceed as follows: (i) all dedicated actuators and sensors in the minimum collections
ensuring structural controllability and observability are required; and (ii) we show that we need at least |I∗C |
(assuming |I∗C | ≥ |I∗B|) feedback links. First, observe that (i) follows from noticing that otherwise there
would exist a non-top or non-bottom linked (in case structural controllability/observability is compromised,
respectively), hence, condition (a) in Theorem 1 does not hold. Secondly, all dedicated actuators and
sensors must be used to obtain a feasible information pattern, since if there is one dedicated actuator
(respectively, dedicated sensor) that is not used then, the non-top linked SCC (respectively, non-bottom
linked SCC) that contains the state variable it controls (respectively, measures) will stand alone when the
digraph associated with the closed-loop system is considered; hence, this SCC has no feedback link on
it, which violates condition (a) in Theorem 4 in [44]. In summary, we need to use |I∗C | feedback links,
i.e., |K∗| ≥ |I∗C |, and the result follows.
Finally, the computational complexity is due to the following components: EIB ,IC can be determined
through a depth-first search rooted in the dedicated input i ∈ IB, which can be achieved in O(|V|+ |E|).
In addition, the sequential pairing requires the computation of the maximum matching associated with
B that can be computed using the Hungarian algorithms, which runs in O(√nm) for a bipartite with
n vertices and m edges, so we obtain (|I∗B| + |I∗C |)
5
2 . Thus, because all the remaining operations have
linear-time complexity, the result follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3: The feasibility follows from noticing that each dedicated actuator and sensor must
be involved in at least k + 1 feedback links. More precisely, suppose by contradiction that this is not the
case, then if a dedicated input has k (or less) feedback links, then when these k feedback links fail the
dedicated input does not have any feedback link incoming on it. Therefore, the non-top linked SCC that
contains the state variable it actuates does not belong to an SCC with a feedback link on it, which violates
condition (a) in Theorem 4 in [44]. Similar reasoning applies when dedicated sensors are considered. Thus,
each dedicated actuator and sensor must be involved in at least k+ 1 feedback links, which is ensured by
considering K∗ = K(1)∪ . . .∪K(k+1), where K(i) is determined using Procedure 1 and K(i)∩K(j) = ∅ for
i 6= j. In addition, the optimality, i.e., the fact that K¯(K∗) is a sparsest information pattern ensuring that
the closed-loop system has no structurally resilient fixed modes, follows from noticing that each dedicated
actuator and sensor is involved in exactly in k + 1 feedback links.
The computational complexity follows the same steps as in Lemma 1, by noticing that the procedure
is executed k times, having in consideration Remark 4. 
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof follows by invoking Theorem 3 in [27], and noticing that there must exists
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at least one state variable actuated in each non-top linked SCC after the failures occur. 
Proof of Theorem 4: The feasibility is obtained as follows: (i) Lemma 2 and its dual, prescribe the
existence of k+1 minimum collections of dedicated actuators and sensors ensuring structural controllability
and observability, respectively; (ii) for each minimum collection i of dedicated actuators and sensors,
Theorem 3 ensures that K¯(K(i)) is the sparsest information pattern ensuring a closed-loop system without
structurally fixed modes; and (iii) because there exist k + 1 digraphs verifying Theorem 4 in [44], i.e.,
D(A¯, B¯, C¯, K¯(K(i))) for i = 1, . . . , k + 1, it follows that Theorem 1 holds. Furthermore, the optimality
follows by noticing that minimum of the sum of the above quantities is achieved by the proposed design.
The computational complexity follows by reproducing the same steps as in Theorem 3 and noticing
that determining k minimum collection of dedicated actuators and sensors, which requires only to identify
the non-top and non-bottom linked SCCs, which can be achieved by determining the decomposition of
the digraph D(A¯) into SCCs that can be implemented in O(|V|+ |E|). 
Proof of Theorem 5: From Theorem 2-(i) in [45], we have that a matrix A˜(K) is Schur if and only if
there exist symmetric matrices X and Y such that
 X A˜(K)ᵀ
A˜(K) Y
  0, and X = Y −1. In addition,
X = Y −1 if and only if X, Y are a solution to the following optimization problem
min
X,Y ∈Sn+
trace(XY )
s.t.
 X I
I Y
  0
and the optimal cost is n [46], and the result follows. 
Proof of Theorem 6: The results follows by invoking the algorithm proposed in [46]. In particular, the
iterative method with cost trace(YkXk+1+XkYk+1) will always converge, such that the constraint Y = X−1
satisfied if the cost converges to 2N [47].

REFERENCES
[1] N. Sandell, P. Varaiya, M. Athans, and M. Safonov, “Survey of decentralized control methods for large scale systems,” IEEE Transactions
on Automatic Control, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 108–128, Apr. 1978.
[2] D. Šiljak, Large-Scale Dynamic Systems: Stability and Structure, ser. Dover Civil and Mechanical Engineering Series. Dover
Publications, 2007.
[3] D. Šiljak and M. Vukcˇevic, “Decentralization, stabilization, and estimation of large-scale linear systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 363–366, Jun 1976.
[4] S. Jain, F. Khorrami, and B. Fardanesh, “Decentralized stabilization and control of large-scale power systems with unknown
interconnections,” International Journal of Control, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 591–608, Feb. 1996.
[5] International Society of Automation, “ISA99, industrial automation and control system security,” https://www.isa.org/isa99.
22
[6] International Electrotechnical Commission, “Industrial communication networks - Network and system security - Part 2-1: Establishing
an industrial automation and control system security program,” https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/7030.
[7] T. M. Chen and S. Abu-Nimeh, “Lessons from Stuxnet,” Computer, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 91–93, Apr 2011.
[8] J. Weiss, “Assuring industrial control system (ics) cyber security,” http://csis.org/publication/
assuring-industrial-control-system-ics-cyber-security.
[9] M. B. Line, A. Zand, G. Stringhini, and R. Kemmerer, “Targeted attacks against industrial control systems: Is the power industry
prepared?” Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Smart Energy Grid Security - SEGS ’14, 2014.
[10] T. Macaulay and B. Singer, Cybersecurity for Industrial Control Systems: SCADA, DCS, PLC, HMI, and SIS. Boca Raton, FL: Taylor
and Francis, 2012.
[11] N. G. Tsoutsos, C. Konstantinou, and M. Maniatakos, “Advanced techniques for designing stealthy hardware trojans,” in Proceedings
of the The 51st Annual Design Automation Conference on Design Automation Conference, 2014, pp. 1–4.
[12] R. Karri, J. Rajendran, K. Rosenfeld, and M. Tehranipoor, “Trustworthy hardware: Identifying and classifying hardware trojans,”
Computer, vol. 43, no. 10, pp. 39–46, 2010.
[13] S.-H. Wang and E. Davison, “On the stabilization of decentralized control systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 18,
no. 5, pp. 473 – 478, oct 1973.
[14] J. P. Corfmat and A. S. Morse, “Decentralized control of linear multivariable systems,” Automatica, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 479–495, Sep.
1976.
[15] Z. Gong and M. Aldeen, “Stabilization of Decentralized Control Systems,” Journal of Mathematical Systems, Estimation and Control,
vol. 7, pp. 1–16, 1997.
[16] A. Mahajan, N. Martins, M. Rotkowitz, and S. Yuksel, “Information structures in optimal decentralized control,” in IEEE 51st Annual
Conference on Decision and Control, Dec 2012, pp. 1291–1306.
[17] L. Bakule, “Decentralized control: An overview,” Annual Reviews in Control, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 87–98, 2008.
[18] L. Bakule and M. Papik, “Decentralized control and communication,” Annual Reviews in Control, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 1–10, 2012.
[19] A. Alavian and M. Rotkowitz, “Fixed modes of decentralized systems with arbitrary information structure,” in 21st International
Symposium on Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems, Dec 2014, pp. 4032–4038.
[20] ——, “Stabilizing decentralized systems with arbitrary information structure,” in IEEE 53rd Annual Conference on Decision and
Control, Dec 2014, pp. 4032–4038.
[21] S. Yuksel, “Decentralized computation and communication in stabilization of distributed control systems,” in Proceedings of Information
Theory and Applications Workshop, ITA, 2009.
[22] C. Langbort and V. Gupta, “Minimal interconnection topology in distributed control design,” SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization,
vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 397–413, 2009.
[23] J.-M. Dion, C. Commault, and J. V. der Woude, “Generic properties and control of linear structured systems: a survey.” Automatica,
pp. 1125–1144, 2003.
[24] X. Liu, H. Lin, and B. M. Chen, “Structural controllability of switched linear systems,” Automatica, vol. 49, no. 12, pp. 3531 – 3537,
2013.
[25] C. Commault and J.-M. Dion, “Input addition and leader selection for the controllability of graph-based systems.” Automatica, vol. 49,
no. 11, pp. 3322–3328, 2013.
[26] Y.-Y. Liu, J.-J. Slotine, and A.-L. Barabási, “Controllability of complex networks,” Nature, vol. 473, no. 7346, pp. 167–173, May 2011.
[27] S. Pequito, S. Kar, and A. P. Aguiar, “A framework for structural input/output and control configuration selection of large-scale systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 303–318, Feb 2016.
[28] ——, “Minimum cost input/output design for large-scale linear structural systems,” Automatica, vol. 68, pp. 384 – 391, 2016.
[29] S. Pequito, S. Kar, and A. Aguiar, “A structured systems approach for optimal actuator-sensor placement in linear time-invariant
systems,” in Proceedings of American Control Conference, June 2013, pp. 6108–6113.
23
[30] S. Pequito, S. Kar, and G. J. Pappas, “Minimum cost constrained input-output and control configuration co-design problem: A structural
systems approach,” in Proceedings of the 2015 American Control Conference, July 2015, pp. 4099–4105.
[31] S. Pequito, S. Kar, and A. P. Aguiar, “On the complexity of the constrained input selection problem for structural linear systems,”
Automatica, vol. 62, pp. 193 – 199, 2015.
[32] S. Pequito, P. Bogdan, and G. J. Pappas, “Minimum Number of Probes for Brain Dynamics Observability,” Proceedings of the 54th
Conference on Decision and Control 2015, pp. 306–311, Dec. 2015.
[33] S. Pequito and G. J. Pappas, “Structural minimum controllability problem for switched linear continuous-time systems,” Automatica,
vol. 78, pp. 216 – 222, 2017.
[34] X. Liu, S. Pequito, S. Kar, B. Sinopoli, and A. P. Aguiar, “Minimum robust sensor placement for large scale linear time-invariant
systems: A structured systems approach,” Under review in the IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering, 2016.
[35] J. F. Carvalho, S. Pequito, A. P. Aguiar, S. Kar, and P. G. J., “Static Output Feedback: On Essential Feasible Information Patterns,”
Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 3989–3994, 2015.
[36] G. Ramos, S. Pequito, S. Kar, and A. P. Aguiar, “Analysis and Design of Electric Power Grids with p -Robustness Guarantees using
a Structural Hybrid System Approach,” Proceedings of the European Control Conference, 2015.
[37] M. Sezer and D. Šiljak, “Structurally fixed modes,” Systems & Control Letters, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 60–64, Jul. 1981.
[38] C. H. Papadimitriou and J. Tsitsiklis, “A simple criterion for structurally fixed modes,” Systems & Control Letters, vol. 4, no. 6, pp.
333 – 337, 1984.
[39] M. D. Ilic´, L. Xie, U. A. Khan, and J. M. F. Moura, “Modeling of future cyber-physical energy systems for distributed sensing and
control,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 825–838, July 2010.
[40] M. Fu, “Pole placement via static output feedback is NP-hard,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 49, no. 5, pp. 855–857,
May 2004.
[41] T. H. Cormen, C. Stein, R. L. Rivest, and C. E. Leiserson, Introduction to Algorithms, 2nd ed. McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2001.
[42] T. Tao and V. Vu, “Random matrices have simple spectrum,” ArXiv e-prints, Dec. 2014. [Online]. Available: http:
//adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2014arXiv1412.1438T
[43] J. P. Hespanha, Linear Systems Theory. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Press, Sep. 2009.
[44] V. Pichai, M. E. Sezer, and D. Šiljak, “Brief paper: A graph-theoretic characterization of structurally fixed modes,” Automatica, vol. 20,
no. 2, pp. 247–250, Mar. 1984.
[45] M. de Oliveira, J. Camino, and R. Skelton, “A convexifying algorithm for the design of structured linear controllers,” in Proceedings
of the 39th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, vol. 3, 2000, pp. 2781–2786 vol.3.
[46] P. Naghshtabrizi and J. P. Hespanha, “Anticipative and non-anticipative controller design for network control systems,” in Networked
Embedded Sensing and Control, ser. Lect. Notes in Contr. and Inform. Sci., P. J. Antsaklis and P. Tabuada, Eds. Berlin: Springer,
2006, vol. 331, pp. 203–218.
[47] L. E. Ghaoui, F. Oustry, and M. Aitrami, “A cone complementarity linearization algorithm for static output-feedback and related
problems,” IEEE Transaction on Automatic Control, pp. 1171–1176, 1997.
